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HOW TEMPLEMIRE V. W & M WELDING, INC. CREATES UNFAIR 
JOB SECURITY 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 15, 2014, the Missouri Supreme Court overruled thirty years of 
precedent in a decision that affects every Missouri employer. The decision has 
been described as “an easy contender for biggest case of 2014.”1 Imagine the 
following scenario: Sally Smith, a waitress at Burger Grill, stole money out of 
the cash register after her Tuesday shift. The next week, Sally was injured 
when a tray of drinks fell on her hand. Sally subsequently filed a workers’ 
compensation claim. Sally’s supervisor fired her a few days later after 
discovering Sally had stolen money from the cash register. Sally believes she 
was fired in retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim and brings an 
action to recover damages. This scenario illustrates a mixed motive problem, 
namely, there is both a lawful and potentially unlawful motive for the 
employer’s actions. Should Sally prevail on a claim for workers’ compensation 
retaliatory discharge? If so, how strong does the link need to be between the 
workers’ compensation claim and the subsequent termination? 
In Missouri, section 287.780 of the Missouri Revised Statutes prohibits an 
employer from retaliating against an employee for filing a workers’ 
compensation claim. Section 287.780 provides: “No employer or agent shall 
discharge or in any way discriminate against any employee for exercising any 
of his rights under [the Workers’ Compensation Law]. Any employee who has 
been discharged or discriminated against shall have a civil action for damages 
against his employer.”2 Before the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision on April 
15, 2014, in order to bring a submissible case under section 287.780, an 
employee had to show: “(1) [his or her] status as employee of defendant before 
injury, (2) [his or her] exercise of a right granted by [the Workers’ 
Compensation Law], (3) employer’s discharge of or discrimination against 
plaintiff, and (4) an exclusive causal relationship between plaintiff’s actions 
and defendant’s actions.”3 
 
 1. Stephanie Maniscalco, Lowering of Work Comp Standard Biggest Decision so Far, MO. 
LAW. WKLY., July 7, 2014, at 1. 
 2. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.780 (2000). 
 3. Hansome v. Nw. Cooperage Co., 679 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Mo. 1984), overruled by 
Templemire v. W & M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371 (Mo. 2014) (emphasis added). 
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Other jurisdictions similarly prohibit employers from retaliating against 
employees who file workers’ compensation claims.4 While most jurisdictions 
uniformly apply the first three elements, courts differ on the standard of 
causation required under the fourth element. “Exclusive cause” is the highest 
standard of causation. An employee must show he or she was discharged solely 
because of filing a workers’ compensation claim.5 A “motivating or significant 
factor” standard of causation is lower than exclusive cause. It requires 
employees to show that filing a workers’ compensation claim was a significant 
reason for their discharge.6 A “contributing factor” standard is lower than the 
motivating or significant factor standard of causation. It requires an employee 
to show only a mere correlation between filing a workers’ compensation claim 
and subsequent discharge, namely, that filing a workers’ compensation claim 
was one of the factors contributing to the employer’s decision to discharge the 
employee.7 
In Templemire v. W & M Welding, Inc., the Missouri Supreme Court 
lowered the standard of causation in workers’ compensation retaliatory 
discharge cases from the well-established exclusive cause8 standard to a much 
lower contributing factor standard.9 In other words, employees now only need 
to prove that filing a workers’ compensation claim was one of the reasons for 
their termination, as opposed to the sole reason for termination.10 
Consequently, Missouri employers face increased liability for workers’ 
compensation retaliatory discharge claims. 
This Note argues that the Missouri Supreme Court erred in its decision to 
promulgate a lesser standard of causation in workers’ compensation retaliatory 
discharge cases. This Note also examines the new contributing factor standard 
of causation and its effects on Missouri employers. Part I will discuss workers’ 
compensation generally. Part II will trace the evolution of workers’ 
compensation retaliatory discharge cases by examining thirty years of 
precedent establishing the exclusive cause standard. Part III will examine the 
 
 4. See Frampton v. Cent. Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ind. 1973); Wallace v. 
Milliken & Co., 406 S.E.2d 358, 360 (S.C. 1973); Buckner v. Gen. Motors Corp., 760 P.2d 803, 
806 (Okla. 1988); Wilmot v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 821 P.2d 18, 32 (Wash. 1991). 
 5. 3 MODERN WORKERS COMP. § 311:12 (1993). 
 6. Amanda C. Kaiser, Comment, Workers’ Compensation—Anderson v. Standard Register 
Co.: Tennessee Supreme Court Specifies Elements Required to Establish a Cause of Action for 
Retaliatory Discharge in Workers’ Compensation Cases, 24 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 825, 829 
(1994). 
 7. Kingsaire, Inc. v. Melendez, 416 S.W.3d 898, 906 (Tex. App. 2013). 
 8. Hansome, 679 S.W.2d at 275. 
 9. Templemire v. W & M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371, 384 (Mo. 2014), as modified on 
May 27, 2014. 
 10. Id. 
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Templemire decision. Part IV will cover the new contributing factor standard 
and will outline concerns associated with the new lesser standard. 
I.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
Prior to the enactment of workers’ compensation laws, recovery for 
employees who were injured on the job was restricted under the common law 
theory of negligence.11 Employees were burdened with overcoming three 
common law defenses used by employers:12 assumption of risk,13 contributory 
negligence,14 and the fellow-servant doctrine.15 The negligence avenue of 
recovery often left employees with no redress.16 Prior to the enactment of 
workers’ compensation laws, it was estimated that between seventy and ninety-
four percent of injured workers who filed a claim against their employer 
received no compensation for their injuries.17 
Various state legislatures responded in the early 1900s by enacting 
workers’ compensation legislation to afford a more effective remedy for 
employees injured on the job.18 By 1920, all but eight states had established 
workers’ compensation acts to provide benefits for injured employees.19 
Missouri joined the national movement in 1925.20 The Missouri Workers’ 
Compensation Law was enacted to wholly substitute common law remedies for 
injured employees.21 This statute struck a balance between employers and 
employees; the employer accepted absolute liability, and, in return, the 
 
 11. Amanda Yoder, Note, Resurrection of a Dead Remedy: Bringing Common Law 
Negligence Back Into Employment Law, 75 MO. L. REV. 1093, 1097 (2010). 
 12. Gunnett v. Girardier Bldg. & Realty Co., 70 S.W.3d 632, 635 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002). 
 13. H. S. J., Torts—Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 11 TEX. L. REV. 565, 566 (1933) (“The 
doctrine of assumption of risk, originating in Priestley v. Fowler is generally treated as the 
voluntary acquiescence by the plaintiff in a risk which either was known or should have been 
known to him at the time of his injury.”) (citation omitted). 
 14. Jennifer J. Karangelen, Comment, The Road to Judicial Abolishment of Contributory 
Negligence Has Been Paved by Bozman v. Bozman, 34 U. BALT. L. REV. 265, 267 (2004) 
(defining “contributory negligence” as “conduct on the part of the plaintiff which falls below the 
standard to which he should conform for his own protection, and which is a legally contributing 
cause co-operating with the negligence of the defendant in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm”). 
 15. Comment, The Creation of a Common Law Rule: The Fellow Servant Rule, 1837–1860, 
132 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 579 (1984) (“The Fellow Servant rule was a rule of tort law created in 
the mid-nineteenth century. It carved out an exception to the well-established rule of respondeat 
superior, and relieved employers of liability for injuries negligently inflicted by any employee 
upon a ‘fellow servant.’”). 
 16. Yoder, supra note 11, at 1098. 
 17. Gunnett, 70 S.W.3d at 635. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 365 n.2 (explaining that Missouri’s Workers’ Compensation Law was adopted in 
1925 and became effective in 1927). 
 21. Leicht v. Venture Stores, Inc., 562 S.W.2d 401, 402 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). 
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employee forewent his right to pursue a negligence claim against his 
employer.22 Employees gave up a potentially higher payout, but employees 
received speedy and guaranteed compensation for work-related injuries.23 By 
1974, the Missouri workers’ compensation legislation became “compulsory for 
all employers with more than five employees.”24 In addition to a system of 
recovery for employees injured on the job, the Missouri Workers’ 
Compensation statute protects employees from retaliatory discharge by 
employers. 
II.  WORKERS’ COMPENSATION RETALIATORY DISCHARGE: THIRTY YEARS OF 
PRECEDENT 
Missouri adheres to the “at-will” employment doctrine, which allows an 
employer to discharge an at-will employee for any reason or for no reason.25 
An at-will employee has no cause of action for wrongful discharge, absent a 
statutory or public policy exception.26 Section 287.780 provides a limited 
statutory exception to the at-will employment doctrine. 
Section 287.780 prohibits employers from retaliating against employees 
who file a workers’ compensation claim. The statute provides: “No employer 
or agent shall discharge or in any way discriminate against any employee for 
exercising any of his rights under [the Workers’ Compensation Law]. Any 
employee who has been discharged or discriminated against shall have a civil 
action for damages against his employer.”27 This anti-retaliation provision 
created a statutory private right of action for retaliatory discharge. The 
elements for a section 287.780 cause of action were set forth by the Missouri 
Supreme Court in 1984. 
A. Hansome v. Northwestern Cooperage Co. (1984) 
The Missouri Supreme Court established elements for a section 287.780 
cause of action for the first time in Hansome v. Northwestern Cooperage Co.28 
In Hansome, an employee exercised his workers’ compensation rights after 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Yoder, supra note 11, at 1099–1100. 
 25. Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 92 (Mo. 2010). 
 26. Id. (“[The Missouri Supreme Court] expressly adopt[ed] the following as the public-
policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine: An at-will employee may not be terminated 
(1) for refusing to violate the law or any well-established and clear mandate of public policy as 
expressed in the constitution, statutes, regulations promulgated pursuant to statute, or rules 
created by a governmental body or (2) for reporting wrongdoing or violations of law to superiors 
or public authorities.”) (citations omitted). 
 27. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.780 (2000). 
 28. Hansome v. Nw. Cooperage Co., 679 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Mo. 1984), overruled by 
Templemire v. W & M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371 (Mo. 2014). 
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suffering from a work-related injury.29 The employee was subsequently 
discharged approximately a month later because “[he] got hurt on the job[,] 
drew [his] Workmen’s Compensation, and went back and forth to the doctor’s 
office.”30 The employee brought an action against his employer pursuant to 
section 287.780.31 A jury returned a verdict for the employee.32 The Missouri 
Court of Appeals, Eastern District, reversed.33 The Missouri Supreme Court 
affirmed the trial court’s decision.34 
The court set forth elements to make a submissible case under section 
287.780 for the first time. The plaintiff employee had to show: “(1) plaintiff’s 
status as employee of defendant before injury, (2) plaintiff’s exercise of a right 
granted by [the Workers’ Compensation Law], (3) employer’s discharge of or 
discrimination against plaintiff, and (4) an exclusive causal relationship 
between plaintiff’s actions and defendant’s actions.”35 The first three elements 
had been met.36 The crux of the case turned on whether a causal relationship 
existed between filing the workers’ compensation claim and the employee’s 
subsequent discharge.37 
The court cited Davis v. Richmond Special Road District38 and Mitchell v. 
St. Louis County39 as support for the exclusive cause standard of causation, 
explaining that “[c]ausality does not exist if the basis for discharge is valid and 
nonpretextual.”40 The court applied the exclusive cause standard and found the 
employee made a submissible case under section 287.780 because he was fired 
for exercising his workers’ compensation rights.41 
 
 29. Id. at 274. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 275. 
 32. Id. at 274. 
 33. Hansome, 679 S.W.2d at 274. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 275 (emphasis added). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Davis v. Richmond Special Rd. Dist., 649 S.W.2d 252, 255 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) 
(“[Section 287.780] reveals a legislative intent that there must be a causal relationship between 
the exercise of the right by the employee and his discharge by his employer arising precisely from 
the employee’s exercise of his rights, and upon proof, that the discharge was related to the 
employee’s exercise of his or her rights.”) (emphasis added). 
 39. Mitchell v. St. Louis Cty., 575 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (“[I]t is palpable 
that a [section 287.780] cause of action lies only if an employee is discharged discriminatorily by 
reason of exercising his or her rights under the Workmen’s Compensation Law.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 40. Hansome, 679 S.W.2d at 275 n.2. 
 41. Id. at 276. 
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B. Crabtree v. Bugby (1998) 
The exclusive cause standard set forth in Hansome was reaffirmed fourteen 
years later by the Missouri Supreme Court in Crabtree v. Bugby.42 In Crabtree, 
an employee brought a retaliatory discharge claim against her employer, 
pursuant to section 287.780, alleging she was discharged for filing a workers’ 
compensation claim.43 The jury returned a verdict for the employee.44 The 
employer appealed and the court of appeals transferred the case to the Missouri 
Supreme Court.45 Judgment was reversed because the trial court had applied a 
“direct result” standard, rather than the exclusive cause standard set forth in 
Hansome.46 
On appeal, the employer challenged the employee’s verdict director who 
instructed the jury to return a verdict for employee if, “as a direct result of 
plaintiff’s filing a claim for compensation, defendant discharged plaintiff.”47 
The court found employee’s verdict director had not accurately stated the law 
because claims brought pursuant to section 278.780 required an “exclusive 
causal relationship between the plaintiff’s cause of action and the discharge.”48 
“Direct result” language, the court reasoned, permitted the jury to return a 
verdict for the employee even though there were multiple reasons for her 
termination.49 The exclusive cause standard, in contrast, required an employee 
to prove that filing a workers’ compensation claim was the only reason for 
termination.50 The court refused to disturb its own precedent, absent “a 
recurring injustice or absurd results,” reasoning that “neither the trial court nor 
the court of appeals is free to redefine the elements in every case that comes 
before them.”51 Those who disagree, the court concluded, “[we]re free to seek 
redress in the legislative arena.”52 
The exclusive cause standard, articulated in Hansome and affirmed in 
Crabtree, was continuously reaffirmed53 until the Missouri Supreme Court 
 
 42. Crabtree v. Bugby, 967 S.W.2d 66, 70 (Mo. 1998), overruled by Templemire v. W & M 
Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371 (Mo. 2014). 
 43. Id. at 69. 
 44. Id. at 70. 
 45. Id. at 68. 
 46. Id. at 68, 71. 
 47. Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 71 (emphasis added). 
 48. Id. (emphasis added). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 71–72 (citation omitted). 
 52. Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 72. 
 53. See Stephenson v. Raskas Dairy, Inc., 26 S.W.3d 209, 214 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) 
(“Respondent failed to make a submissible case of discriminatory discharge, in that she did not 
prove that the exclusive cause of her discharge was the exercise of her workers’ compensation 
rights.”); Blair v. Steadley Co., 740 S.W.2d 329, 333 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (“[T]here is no doubt 
but that the declaration of the exclusive causal relationship test in Hansome was a declaration of 
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overruled its own precedent on April 15, 2014. In Templemire v. W & M 
Welding, Inc., the Missouri Supreme Court lowered the causation standard for 
workers’ compensation retaliatory discharge claims from exclusive cause to 
contributing factor. 
III.  TEMPLEMIRE V. W & M WELDING, INC. 
A. Facts 
John Templemire (“Templemire”) was hired by W & M Welding, Inc. as a 
painter and general laborer.54 While performing his usual duties, Templemire’s 
left foot was crushed by a large metal beam that fell from a forklift.55 
Templemire subsequently filed a workers’ compensation claim.56 After only a 
few weeks, Templemire returned to work, but his physician ordered certain 
physical restrictions.57 For instance, Templemire was not able to climb stairs, 
push, pull, or stand for longer than one hour without a fifteen-minute break.58 
On the morning of November 29, 2006, Templemire was ordered to wash and 
paint a railing.59 Templemire performed other tasks while he waited for the 
railing to be prepared for washing.60 Later in the afternoon, before washing and 
painting the railing, Templemire took a break to rest his foot.61 Gary McMullin 
(“McMullin”), the owner of W & M Welding, Inc., was infuriated when he 
found Templemire taking a break and the unwashed railing.62 McMullin 
immediately fired Templemire.63 
B. Procedural Posture 
Templemire subsequently filed suit against W & M Welding, Inc., 
pursuant to section 287.780, alleging workers’ compensation retaliatory 
discharge.64 During the jury instruction conference, Templemire argued that 
 
substantive law.”); Wiedower v. ACF Indus., Inc., 715 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) 
(“The exclusive cause for the employee’s discharge must be the exercise of a right under the 
Workers’ Compensation Law.”) (citing Hansome v. Nw. Cooperage Co., 679 S.W.2d 273, 275 
(Mo. 1984)). 
 54. Templemire v. W & M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371, 373 (Mo. 2014), as modified on 
May 27, 2014. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 374. 
 59. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 374. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 374. 
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the applicable Missouri Approved Instruction (MAI) verdict director misstated 
Missouri law because its “exclusive cause” language was contrary to the plain 
language of section 287.780.65 Templemire tendered a modified instruction 
substituting “contributing factor” for the “exclusive cause” language.66 The 
circuit court nevertheless instructed the jury on the “exclusive cause” standard 
of causation, and the jury returned a verdict for W & M Welding, Inc.67 
On appeal, Templemire alleged that the circuit court erred in refusing to 
instruct the jury to use the contributing factor standard.68 In support of his 
assertion, Templemire argued that the exclusive cause standard is contrary to 
the statutory language of section 287.780, and also the causation standard 
applied in both Missouri Human Rights Act and public policy wrongful 
termination cases.69 
The Missouri Supreme Court reversed and remanded.70 Specifically, the 
Missouri Supreme Court found the exclusive causation standard was 
unsupported by both case law and the plain language of section 287.780.71 The 
court declined to adhere to precedent, overruling the two seminal cases 
establishing the exclusive cause standard for workers’ compensation retaliation 
claims.72 Further, the court held that a contributing factor standard of causation 
is proper for section 287.780 claims.73 The Missouri Supreme Court found the 
circuit court erred when it instructed the jury using “exclusive cause” 
language, and the error resulted in prejudice that materially affected the case.74 
As a result, Templemire was entitled to a new trial where the jury is instructed 
using the contributing factor standard.75 
C. Majority Opinion 
1. Historic Construction of Section 287.780 
Judge Draper, writing for the majority, began his analysis by examining 
the historic construction of section 287.780. Section 287.780 was enacted as 
 
 65. Id. at 375; “No employer or agent shall discharge or in any way discriminate against any 
employee for exercising any of his rights under this chapter. Any employee who has been 
discharged or discriminated against shall have a civil action for damages against his employer.” 
MO. REV. STAT. § 287.780 (2000). 
 66. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 375. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 376. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 386. 
 71. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 382. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 384. 
 74. Id. at 385. 
 75. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2016] HOW TEMPLEMIRE V. W & M WELDING, INC. CREATES UNFAIR JOB SECURITY 325 
part of the Missouri Workers’ Compensation Law and provided a statutory 
exception to the at-will employment doctrine.76 Specifically, it provided a 
private right of action for employees who were “discharged or discriminated 
against” for filing a workers’ compensation claim.77 Section 287.780 was 
enacted as part of the original workers’ compensation law in 1925 and 
amended in 1973 with the language that remains today.78 
The court next surveyed Missouri cases construing section 287.780, 
beginning with Mitchell v. St. Louis County.79 Mitchell had been the first case 
to address section 287.780.80 An employee had alleged her discharge was 
discriminatory because it had occurred only months after she had filed a 
workers’ compensation claim.81 The record amply supported that she had been 
discharged for excessive absenteeism.82 Causality did not exist, the court had 
concluded, because the basis for the discharge had not been pretextual.83 The 
court in Templemire noted that Mitchell did not explicitly discuss the proper 
causation standard to apply, but it generally recognized a need for a causal 
connection between a workers’ compensation claim and subsequent 
discharge.84 
The court then examined Davis v. Richmond Special Road District.85 The 
Davis court had stated, “[Section 287.780] reveals a legislative intent that there 
must be a causal relationship between the exercise of the right by the employee 
and his discharge by his employer . . . .”86 The mere discharge of an employee, 
the Davis court stated, was not enough.87 Rather, an employee was burdened 
with demonstrating that he had been discriminated against “simply because of 
the exercise of his or her rights regarding a workers’ compensation claim.”88 
The court in Templemire noted that although Davis recognized causation as an 
 
 76. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 376; see Margiotta v. Christian Hosp. Ne. Nw., 315 S.W.3d 
342, 345–46 (Mo. 2010) (“The at-will employment doctrine is well-established Missouri law. 
Absent an employment contract with a ‘definite statement of duration . . . an employment at will 
is created.’ An employer may terminate an at-will employee ‘for any reason or for no reason.’ 
The at-will doctrine is ‘[r]ooted in freedom of contract and private property principles, designed 
to yield efficiencies across a broad range of industries.’”) (citations omitted). 
 77. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 377. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Mitchell v. St. Louis Cty., 575 S.W.2d 813 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). 
 80. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 377. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 379. 
 85. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 377; see also Davis v. Richmond Special Rd. Dist., 649 
S.W.2d 252 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). 
 86. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 377 (emphasis omitted). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
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element of a workers’ compensation retaliatory discharge claim, it had not 
suggested a heightened exclusive cause standard.89 
In 1984, the Missouri Supreme Court, for the first time, articulated the 
exclusive cause standard of causation for claims brought pursuant to section 
287.780 in Hansome v. Northwestern Cooperage Co.90 In Hansome, the 
Missouri Supreme Court set forth four elements a plaintiff had to demonstrate 
pursuant to a claim for retaliatory discharge under section 287.780.91 To satisfy 
the final element, plaintiff had to demonstrate “an exclusive causal relationship 
between [employee’s] actions and [employer’s] actions.”92 The court in 
Templemire expressed concern that the Hansome test had been based on 
Mitchell v. St. Louis County and Davis v. Richmond Special Road District 
rather than an analysis or interpretation of the statutory language of section 
287.780.93 The Templemire court found that Hansome’s reliance on Mitchell 
and Davis for the exclusive cause standard had been unfounded because 
neither contained any reference to a heightened or exclusive cause standard of 
causation.94 
The court next considered its decision in Crabtree v. Bugby,95 which had 
reaffirmed Hansome’s exclusive cause standard.96 The court in Crabtree had 
reasoned that “this Court should not lightly disturb its own precedent . . . in the 
absence of a recurring injustice or absurd results.”97 The court in Templemire 
did not find the majority’s reasoning in Crabtree compelling. Rather, the 
Templemire court aligned with the dissenting opinion in Crabtree, which had 
challenged the “exclusive cause” standard articulated by Hansome.98 The 
dissent in Crabtree had based its contention on a textual analysis of section 
287.780 that revealed an absence of the word “exclusive,” as used in the 
Hansome test, as well as any other language that suggested an employee may 
only recover if he has been discharged exclusively because he had filed a 
workers’ compensation claim.99 Furthermore, the dissent had noted that neither 
Mitchell nor Davis, the authority by which the Hansome test was based, had 
used the word “exclusive” in reference to the causation standard under section 
 
 89. Id. at 379. 
 90. Hansome v. Nw. Cooperage Co., 679 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Mo. 1984), overruled by 
Templemire v. W & M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371 (Mo. 2014). 
 91. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 377–78. 
 92. Id. at 378. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 379. 
 95. See Crabtree v. Bugby, 967 S.W.2d 66, 71 (Mo. 1998), overruled by Templemire v. W & 
M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371 (Mo. 2014). 
 96. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 378 (citation omitted). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 379. 
 99. Id. at 378. 
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287.780.100 Consequently, the dissent in Crabtree rejected the Hansome test, 
and it characterized the “exclusive cause” language as “‘an aberration’ . . . 
[which] ‘appears to be plucked out of thin air.’”101 
The court continued its discussion with Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Institute, 
P.C., the first case to question the exclusive cause standard since it was first 
articulated in Hansome.102 Fleshner involved a retaliatory discharge claim 
based on the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.103 
The court for the first time had recognized a public policy exception to the at-
will employment doctrine, and thus had to determine the proper causation 
standard to apply.104 The employer had offered a jury instruction with the 
“exclusive cause” language, borrowed from the causation standard for 
statutory retaliatory discharge as set forth in Hansome.105 The court criticized 
the exclusive cause standard of causation because “[n]owhere in the workers’ 
compensation laws does ‘exclusive causal’ or ‘exclusive causation’ language 
appear.”106 Additionally, the court had warned that application of the exclusive 
cause standard would provide a disincentive for employees to report their 
employers’ violations of the law.107 
The court in Templemire found the exclusive cause standard was 
unfounded because neither Mitchell nor Davis, the authority by which the 
exclusive cause standard was articulated, contained any reference to a 
heightened exclusive cause standard. 108 The court held that stare decisis 
should not be applied because Hansome and Crabtree were clearly 
erroneous.109 After finding no case law to support the exclusive cause standard, 
the court next looked for statutory support. 
2. Plain Language of Section 287.780 
The court analyzed the plain language of section 287.780, which “prohibits 
an employer from discharging or in any way discriminating against an 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 378 (citation omitted). 
 102. See Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 92 (Mo. 2010). 
 103. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 378–79. 
 104. Id. at 379; see also Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 90 (“The issue before this Court is how the 
jury should be instructed as to the appropriate causation standard when an at-will employee is 
discharged in violation of the public-policy exception.”). 
 105. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 379. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 379. 
 109. Id. (The court articulated the standard for adhering to precedent: “adherence to precedent 
is not absolute . . . . [W]here it appears that an opinion is clearly erroneous and manifestly wrong, 
the rule [of] stare decisis is never applied to prevent the repudiation of such decision”) (alteration 
in original) (citation omitted). 
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employee for exercising his or her workers’ compensation rights.”110 This 
language, the Templemire court reasoned, dictated a clear legislative intent to 
prohibit an employer from giving any consideration to an employee’s workers’ 
compensation claim.111 Requiring an employee to show his or her discharge 
was based solely or exclusively on the fact that he or she filed a workers’ 
compensation claim, the court warned, would allow for some discrimination, 
which runs afoul of legislative intent.112 Furthermore, a textual analysis of the 
statutory language exposed an absence of the words “exclusively,” “solely,” 
and “only,” any of which would support a heightened or exclusive cause 
standard.113 Accordingly, the court found no statutory support for the exclusive 
cause standard promulgated in Hansome.114 
After concluding that the exclusive cause standard had no support in either 
case law or statutory interpretation, the Templemire court sought to determine 
the appropriate causation standard for retaliatory discharge claims brought 
pursuant to section 287.780.115 
3. Appropriate Causation Standard 
Templemire urged the court to adopt a “contributing factor” standard, 
which would allow an employee to recover if the employee’s workers’ 
compensation claim was one of the reasons for termination.116 The employer, 
on the other hand, urged the court to adhere to a “heightened” or “motivating 
factor” test.117 In order to determine the proper causation standard for workers’ 
compensation retaliatory discharge claims, the court looked to case law 
interpreting other forms of employment discrimination and the statutory 
language of section 287.780.118 
In 2007, the court had held, in Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights,119 
that an employee must show his status under the Missouri Human Rights Act 
(MHRA)120 was a contributing factor to his discharge.121 The contributing 
 
 110. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 381. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 382. 
 113. Id. at 381. 
 114. Id. at 382. 
 115. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 382. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 383–84. 
 119. See Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 820 (Mo. 2007). 
 120. The Missouri Human Rights Act prohibits an employer from considering age, disability, 
or other protected characteristics when making an employment decision. MO. REV. STAT. § 
213.055 (2014). The MHRA retaliation provision provides: 
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice . . . [t]o retaliate or discriminate in any 
manner against any other person because such person has opposed any practice prohibited 
by this chapter or because such person has filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or 
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factor standard for MHRA retaliation claims was reaffirmed two years later in 
Hill v. Ford Motor Co.122 Further, in 2010, the court held in Fleshner that the 
appropriate standard of causation for wrongful discharge claims brought under 
the public policy exception123 to the at-will employment doctrine was 
contributing factor.124 The Templemire court stated that a contributing factor 
standard of causation would accordingly “align[] workers’ compensation 
discrimination with other Missouri employment discrimination laws,” such as 
the MHRA and the public policy exception to Missouri’s at-will employment 
doctrine.125 The court, however, recognized a fundamental difference between 
the purpose of workers’ compensation laws and the purpose of the MHRA.126 
Nevertheless, the court found commonality in the broad purpose of all 
employment discrimination laws.127 The court reasoned as follows: 
[T]here can be no tolerance for employment discrimination in the 
workplace . . . . Discrimination against an employee for exercising his or her 
rights under the workers’ compensation law is just as illegal, insidious, and 
reprehensible as discrimination under the [Missouri Human Rights Act] or for 
retaliatory discharge under the public policy exception of the at-will 
employment doctrine.128 
The court also considered the statutory language of section 287.780 to 
determine the proper standard of causation. Section 287.780 prohibits an 
employer from discriminating against an employee “in any way” for exercising 
his or her rights under the Missouri Workers’ Compensation Law.129 The court 
found the phrase “in any way” to be consistent with a “contributing factor” 
standard rather than an “exclusive cause” standard.130 Thus, the court 
maintained, a contributing factor standard “fulfills the purpose of the statute, 
 
participated in any manner in any investigation, proceeding or hearing conducted pursuant 
to this chapter. 
MO. REV. STAT. § 213.070(2) (2014). 
 121. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 383. 
 122. Id. at 383; see also Hill v. Ford Motor Co., 277 S.W.3d 659, 665 (Mo. 2009). 
 123. Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 92 (Mo. 2010) (“[T]his Court 
expressly adopts the following as the public-policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine: 
An at-will employee may not be terminated (1) for refusing to violate the law or any well-
established and clear mandate of public policy as expressed in the constitution, statutes, 
regulations promulgated pursuant to statute, or rules created by a governmental body or (2) for 
reporting wrongdoing or violations of law to superiors or public authorities.”) (citations omitted). 
 124. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 384. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.780 (2014). 
 130. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 384. 
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which is to prohibit employers from discharging or in any way discriminating 
against an employee for exercising his or her rights under chapter 287.”131 
After analyzing case law interpreting other forms of employment 
discrimination and the statutory language of section 287.780, the court held the 
appropriate standard of causation in workers’ compensation retaliatory 
discharge claims is contributing factor.132 This means an employee is entitled 
to relief where filing a workers’ compensation claim was a contributing factor 
in his or her discharge.133 In doing so, the Missouri Supreme Court overturned 
thirty years of precedent. 
D. Dissent 
Judge Fischer and Judge Wilson dissented from the majority’s overruling 
of Hansome and Crabtree.134 The dissent’s main concern stemmed from the 
majority’s failure to adhere to stare decisis.135 The dissent noted that the court 
was not tasked with a matter of first impression.136 The court should have been 
bound by precedent, especially “when that precedent concerns settled 
questions of statutory interpretation,” as it did in this case.137 Absent a more 
compelling need, the dissent contended, passage of time and a change in court 
membership is not enough to overturn precedent.138 Further, hindsight as to 
whether the exclusive cause standard was correct does not change the fact that 
the court had construed section 287.780 in Hansome, and thus the court should 
have been bound by it.139 
The dissent further argued that the failure of the legislature to enact 
legislation on this subject matter, namely, the standard of causation in workers’ 
compensation retaliation cases, acted as ratification of the court’s statutory 
interpretation.140 The Missouri Legislature overhauled the workers’ 
compensation law in 2005, while specifically leaving the judicial 
interpretations in Hansome and Crabtree undisturbed.141 The dissent 
emphasized that such legislative action demonstrated an “intent to retain the 
exclusive cause standard for workers’ compensation retaliation claims.”142 The 
majority’s opinion thus offended the legislature’s ratification of the exclusive 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 386 (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
 135. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 386. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 386–87. 
 139. Id. at 389. 
 140. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 390. 
 141. Id. at 389–90. 
 142. Id. at 390. 
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cause standard of causation.143 The dissent warned that “[e]ven if the 
‘contributing factor’ standard is the better rule, this Court should not usurp the 
legislative function by re-deciding settled questions of statutory construction 
due solely to a change of heart.”144 
The new contributing factor standard of causation for workers’ 
compensation retaliatory discharge is controversial. The new standard will 
have far-reaching effects on all Missouri employers. Accordingly, the next 
section of this Note discusses concerns associated with the new lesser standard 
of causation. 
IV.  NEW STANDARD: THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT GOT IT WRONG 
In a 5–2 decision, the Missouri Supreme Court abandoned the exclusive 
cause standard of causation, overruling its own precedent, which had explicitly 
established the standard of causation for workers’ compensation retaliatory 
discharge claims. In doing so, the court has burdened employers. It is now 
easier for employees to bring frivolous workers’ compensation retaliatory 
discharge claims, creating heightened job security. Accordingly, the circuit 
court’s decision, which relied on the exclusive cause standard, should have 
been affirmed145 for six reasons: (A) the contributing factor standard fails to 
align workers’ compensation retaliation claims with MHRA claims, (B) the 
exclusive cause standard has remained unchanged for thirty years, (C) the 
exclusive cause standard is consistent with the legislature’s intent, (D) 
precedent in other states supports a heightened standard of causation, (E) a 
heightened standard of causation would align Missouri with federal 
discrimination laws, and (F) the new contributing factor standard has far-
reaching, adverse implications on Missouri employers. 
A. The contributing factor standard fails to align workers’ compensation 
retaliation claims with MHRA claims 
The court in Templemire established that a submissible case for workers’ 
compensation retaliatory discharge requires an employee to show that filing a 
workers’ compensation claim is only a contributing factor to the employee’s 
discharge.146 The new contributing factor standard fails to align section 
287.780 cases with MHRA retaliation cases as the majority in Templemire 
 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. I will also alternatively argue that the court should have applied at least a significant or 
motivating factor standard, which is higher than contributing factor but lower than exclusive 
cause. See infra Part IV(D). 
 146. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 384. 
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intended.147 A comparison of the new jury instruction for workers’ 
compensation retaliatory discharge cases and the jury instruction for MHRA 
retaliation cases indicates that the standard for section 287.780 cases is even 
more burdensome on employers than for MHRA cases. The contributing factor 
standard is now reflected in Missouri Approved Instruction (MAI) 38.04, the 
jury instruction used in retaliatory discharge cases brought under section 
287.780. MAI 38.04 became effective on January 1, 2015 and provides the 
elements of a section 287.780 cause of action: 
Your verdict must be for plaintiff if you believe: 
First, plaintiff was employed by defendant, and 
Second, plaintiff filed a workers’ compensation claim, and 
Third, defendant discharged plaintiff, and 
Fourth, plaintiff’s filing of the workers’ compensation claim was a 
contributing factor to plaintiff’s discharge, and 
Fifth, as a direct result of such discharge plaintiff sustained damage.148 
The MHRA instruction, MAI 38.01(A), includes similar language;149 
however, MAI 38.01(A) also includes affirmative defense language: “unless 
you believe plaintiff is not entitled to recover by reason of Instruction Number 
___ (here insert number of affirmative defense instruction).”150 The newly 
revised MAI 38.04 does not include affirmative defense language. In addition 
to the affirmative defense option, employers subject to a MHRA retaliation 
claim may also use a “lawful justification” jury instruction. MAI 38.02 directs 
the jury to find for the employer if there was a lawful reason for the alleged 
discriminatory act and the protected classification was not a contributing 
factor.151 There is no “lawful justification” jury instruction for employers 
subject to a claim under section 287.780. Consequently, the new “contributing 
factor” standard fails to align workers’ compensation retaliatory discharge 
cases with MHRA cases. In order to truly align these causes of action, the 
 
 147. Id. at 382, 384 (“[The standard] now aligns workers’ compensation discrimination with 
other Missouri employment discrimination laws.”). 
 148. MO. APPROVED JURY INSTR. (CIVIL) 38.04 (7th ed.) (emphasis added). 
 149. MO. APPROVED JURY INSTR. (CIVIL) 38.01(A) (7th ed.) (“Your verdict must be for 
plaintiff if you believe: First, defendant (here insert the alleged discriminatory act, such as 
“failed to hire,” “discharged” or other act within the scope of § 213.055, RSMo) plaintiff, and 
Second, (here insert one or more of the protected classifications supported by the evidence such 
as race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, age or disability) was a contributing factor 
in such (here, repeat alleged discriminatory act, such as “failure to hire,” “discharge,” etc.), and 
Third, as a direct result of such conduct, plaintiff sustained damage. * [unless you believe 
plaintiff is not entitled to recover by reason of Instruction Number ______ (here insert number of 
affirmative defense instruction)].”). 
 150. Id. 
 151. MO. APPROVED JURY INSTR. (CIVIL) 38.02 (7th ed.). 
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legislature should provide employers who are subject to a workers’ 
compensation retaliatory discharge claim with affirmative defenses and a 
lawful justification option. Otherwise, workers’ compensation retaliatory 
discharge cases are actually more burdensome on employers than MHRA 
cases. 
B. The exclusive cause standard has remained unchanged for thirty years 
and should remain unchanged 
The majority’s failure to adhere to well-established precedent threatens the 
fabric of our legal system.152 “What makes this country’s legal system the envy 
of the modern democratic world, and what sets it apart from most others, is the 
reliability of the outcome of cases based on the doctrine of stare decisis.”153 
Missouri case law provided clear precedent on the standard of causation to 
apply in workers’ compensation retaliation cases. The Missouri Supreme Court 
articulated a standard for section 287.780 cases and has reaffirmed that 
standard.154 
Judicial abandonment of the exclusive cause standard requires an injustice 
or absurdity.155 “[A] decision of this Court should not be lightly overruled, 
particularly where the opinion has remained unchanged for many years and is 
not clearly erroneous and manifestly wrong.”156 The court in Crabtree 
explained that “[m]ere disagreement by the current Court with the statutory 
analysis of a predecessor Court is not a satisfactory basis for violating the 
doctrine of stare decisis . . . in the absence of a recurring injustice or absurd 
results.”157 Adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis ensures stability and 
predictability in the law.158 The majority in Templemire failed to convey any 
injustice or absurdity to overcome the steadfast deference to stare decisis. 
In Crabtree, the Missouri Supreme Court actually warned of the absurd 
results that would occur if the exclusive cause standard for a section 287.780 
cause of action was abandoned.159 The court cautioned that a lesser standard of 
causation “would encourage marginally competent employees to file the most 
 
 152. See Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 386 (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 377–78. The “exclusive cause” standard of causation for section 287.780 workers’ 
compensation retaliatory discharge cases was first articulated in Hansome and reaffirmed in 
Crabtree. Id. 
 155. Crabtree v. Bugby, 967 S.W.2d 66, 72 (Mo. 1998), overruled by Templemire v. W & M 
Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371 (Mo. 2014). 
 156. Eighty Hundred Clayton Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue, 111 S.W.3d 409, 411 n.3 (Mo. 2003) 
(citation omitted). 
 157. Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 71–72. 
 158. Ronnoco Coffee Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 185 S.W.3d 676, 681 n.11 (Mo. 2006). 
 159. Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 72. 
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petty claims in order to enjoy the benefits of heightened job security.”160 
Employees who were fired for legitimate reasons, such as absenteeism or 
incompetence, would still be able to bring a retaliation claim against their 
employers if they had recently filed a workers’ compensation claim.161 
Employers may, as a result, hesitate to fire otherwise incompetent employees 
in order to avoid the increased costs of a potential retaliation claim. 
Abandoning the exclusive cause standard in favor of a lower contributing 
factor standard would thus result in heightened job security, a far cry from the 
purpose of workers’ compensation.162 As a result, work quality will likely 
decline and employers may hesitate to expand their workforce. 
The precedent for a section 287.780 cause of action had been well 
established and should have been followed. Mere disagreement with the 
statutory analysis of a predecessor court is not enough.163 If the exclusive cause 
standard was problematic, redress was available in the legislative arena.164 
C. The exclusive cause standard is consistent with the legislature’s intent 
The actions, or in this case inactions, of the Missouri Legislature support 
the exclusive cause standard of causation for retaliatory discharge actions 
brought against an employer. Despite thirty years of opportunity, the Missouri 
Legislature did not change the exclusive cause standard first articulated by the 
court in Hansome.165 While legislative inaction might sometimes be 
ambiguous, in this case it is not. The legislature ratifies a judicial interpretation 
by enacting legislation on the same subject matter without changing the 
judicial interpretation.166 In 2005, the Missouri Legislature revised the 
Workers’ Compensation Law, leaving the cause of action under section 
287.780 unaltered.167 The legislature’s failure to revise section 287.780 after 
judicial interpretation can be construed as adoption of the exclusive cause 
standard developed by courts.168 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. (“The purpose of the workers’ compensation law, including the rule of liberal 
construction, is to compensate workers for job-related injuries; it is not to insure job security.”). 
 163. Id. at 71–72. 
 164. Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 72. 
 165. Hansome v. Nw. Cooperage Co., 679 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Mo. 1984). 
 166. Templemire v. W & M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371, 388 (Mo. 2014) (Fischer, J., 
dissenting). 
 167. Changes in Missouri Workers Compensation Law, HEALTHLINK (Aug. 2005), 
http://www.healthlink.com/documents/mo_compensation_law.pdf [http://perma.cc/8FB8-YC2S] 
(listing specific changes in Missouri’s Workers’ Compensation Law and failing to indicate any 
changes to section 287.780). 
 168. Dow Chem. Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 834 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Mo. 1992) (“The construction 
of a statute by a court of last resort becomes a part of the statute ‘as if it had been so amended by 
the legislature.’”) (citation omitted). 
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The Missouri Legislature has, in the past, specifically rejected judicial 
interpretations of Missouri’s Workers’ Compensation Law. For instance, in 
section 287.043, the legislature specifically rejected and abrogated earlier case 
law interpreting the meaning of “owner.”169 This illustrates that the Missouri 
Legislature has rejected a judicial interpretation that ran afoul of the 
legislature’s intent. Conversely, the Missouri Legislature allowed the 
“exclusive cause” interpretation of section 287.780 to stand while it made 
specific revisions on the same subject matter,170 constituting ratification by 
Missouri’s Legislature of the “exclusive cause” standard. The dissent in 
Templemire warned that “[t]o overrule a legislative ratification of this Court’s 
prior statutory interpretations is to encroach on the function of the 
legislature.”171 Therefore, legislative intent supports an exclusive cause 
standard of causation in workers’ compensation retaliatory discharge cases. 
D. Precedent in other states supports a heightened standard of causation 
In addition to thirty years of precedent in Missouri, well-established laws 
in other states shed light on the need for a standard of causation higher than 
contributing factor. The court in Templemire held that the text of section 
287.780 demanded a low standard of causation, namely, the contributing factor 
standard, because of the phrase “in any way,” and an absence of the words 
“exclusively,” “solely,” or “only.”172 However, similar statutory causes of 
action for retaliatory discharge in other states, which use or omit similar 
language, require a higher standard of causation. Other state statutes, like 
section 287.780, do not explicitly require a heightened standard in the statutory 
language, but they have nevertheless been interpreted by courts to require a 
higher standard. For instance, in Washington, section 51.48.025 of the Revised 
Code of Washington provides: 
No employer may discharge or in any manner discriminate against any 
employee because such employee has filed or communicated to the employer 
an intent to file a claim for compensation or exercises any rights provided 
under this title. However, nothing in this section prevents an employer from 
taking any action against a worker for other reasons including, but not limited 
 
 169. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.043 (2015) (“In applying the provisions of subsection 1 of section 
287.020 and subsection 4 of section 287.040, it is the intent of the legislature to reject and 
abrogate earlier case law interpretations on the meaning of or definition of ‘owner’, as extended 
in the following cases: Owner Operator Independent Drivers Ass’n., Inc. v. New Prime, Inc., 133 
S.W.3d 162 (Mo. App. S.D., 2004); Nunn v. C.C. Midwest, 151 S.W.3d 388 (Mo. App. W.D., 
2004).”) (emphasis added). 
 170. Changes in Missouri Workers Compensation Law, supra note 167. 
 171. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 388 (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
 172. Id. at 381. 
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to, the worker’s failure to observe health or safety standards adopted by the 
employer, or the frequency or nature of the worker’s job-related accidents.173 
Although the statutory text does not provide language such as “exclusively,” 
“solely,” or “only,” Washington courts have interpreted the statutory text as 
requiring a heightened standard of causation.174 For example, the court in 
Wilmot v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. applied a substantial factor 
standard of causation, which required the employee to prove that filing a 
workers’ compensation claim was a “substantial” or “significant” factor in the 
employer’s decision to discharge the employee.175 Additionally, section 
51.48.025 uses the phrase “in any manner,” much like the phrase “in any way,” 
used in section 287.780. Unlike the Templemire court, Washington courts 
construe this language as requiring a heightened standard of causation, namely, 
a substantial factor standard.176 While this is not as strict as the exclusive cause 
standard, it is a higher standard than the contributing factor standard because 
an employee must show more than a mere correlation between filing a 
workers’ compensation claim and subsequent discharge. 
Similarly, Oregon courts have required a heightened standard of causation 
for workers’ compensation retaliatory discharge claims, despite a lack of 
explicit statutory language, such as “exclusively,” “solely,” or “only.” Section 
659A.040 of the Oregon Revised Statutes provides: 
It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against 
a worker with respect to hire or tenure or any term or condition of employment 
because the worker has applied for benefits or invoked or utilized the 
procedures provided for in [the Workers’ Compensation Law] or has given 
testimony under the provisions of those laws.177 
The court in Lewis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. interpreted section 659A.040 to 
require a heightened standard of causation, namely, substantial factor or “a 
factor that made a difference.”178 
Interpretations of similar statutory causes of action indicate that the court 
in Templemire should have, at the very least, adopted a significant factor 
standard of causation. This standard of causation is higher than a contributing 
factor standard but lower than exclusive cause, and it would require employees 
to show that filing a workers’ compensation claim was a “substantial factor” in 
 
 173. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.48.025 (2015) (emphasis added). 
 174. Wilmot v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 821 P.2d 18, 30 (Wash. 1991). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.040 (2013). 
 178. Lewis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Civil No. 08-410-ST, 2009 WL 3462056, at *7 (D. Or. 
Oct. 21, 2009). 
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their termination.179 A heightened standard of causation would align Missouri 
with other states as well as the federal government. 
E. A heightened standard of causation would align Missouri with the federal 
government 
A lower standard of causation means Missouri is departing even further 
from federal anti-discrimination statutes. Since 2007, there has been a general 
trend toward lowering the burden of proof necessary for a Missouri employee 
to recover in employment discrimination cases. This trend began in Daugherty 
v. City of Maryland Heights, where the court lessened the burden of proof for 
MHRA discrimination cases from “motivating factor” to “contributing 
factor.”180 The Templemire decision continued the trajectory by lowering the 
standard of causation in workers’ compensation retaliatory discharge cases 
from “exclusive cause” to “contributing factor.”181 As a result, the contributory 
factor standard of causation widens the gap between Missouri and federal 
discrimination laws. 
A gap exists between the causation standard for MHRA retaliation cases 
and its federal counterpart. The MHRA prohibits an employer from 
discriminating “because of the race, color, religion, national origin, sex, 
ancestry, age or disability of any individual[.]”182 The retaliation provision of 
the MHRA provides: 
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice . . . [t]o retaliate or discriminate 
in any manner against any other person because such person has opposed any 
practice prohibited by this chapter or because such person has filed a 
complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in any 
investigation, proceeding or hearing conducted pursuant to this chapter[.]183 
Missouri courts apply a “contributing factor” standard of causation for 
retaliation cases brought under the MHRA.184 Thus, an employee must show 
that “color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, age, or disability”185 was a 
contributing factor in the employer’s alleged discriminatory act.186 
On the federal level, a higher standard of causation is required in 
retaliation cases. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) was 
 
 179. Wilmot, 821 P.2d at 30. 
 180. Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 819–20 (Mo. 2007). 
 181. Templemire v. W & M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371, 384 (Mo. 2014). 
 182. MO. ANN. STAT. § 213.055 (West 2012). 
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 184. Daugherty, 231 S.W.3d at 820. 
 185. MO. ANN. STAT. § 213.055. 
 186. Daugherty, 231 S.W.3d at 820; see also MO. APPROVED JURY INSTR. (Civil) 38.01(A) 
(7th ed.); MO. APPROVED JURY INSTR. (Civil) 38.01(B) (7th ed.). 
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enacted in 1967 to protect employees from arbitrary age requirements.187 
Under the ADEA, it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an 
employee “because of such individual’s age.”188 The ADEA retaliation 
provision provides: 
It shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of his 
employees . . . because such individual . . . has opposed any practice made 
unlawful by this section, or because such individual . . . testified, assisted, or 
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under 
this chapter.189 
An employee bringing a disparate-treatment claim under the ADEA must show 
that age was the “but-for” cause of the employer’s alleged age 
discrimination.190 “The parameters of this but-for standard are unclear, with 
some suggesting it will require proof of sole causation.”191 Therefore, a “but-
for” causation standard can be construed as a heightened standard, more akin 
to the exclusive cause standard than a contributing factor standard of causation. 
On the federal level, under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to 
discriminate “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.”192 Title VII’s retaliation provision provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate 
against any of his employees . . . to discriminate against any individual . . . 
because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice 
by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or 
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under 
this subchapter.193 
Federal courts apply traditional “but-for” causation for retaliation cases 
brought under Title VII.194 Thus, an employee must show “the unlawful 
retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful 
action or actions of the employer.”195 
The exclusive cause standard of causation would thereby align Missouri 
discrimination laws more closely with federal protections. In doing so, the 
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court would help make Missouri more “economically competitive.”196 For 
instance, businesses would no longer have to keep track of different federal 
and state standards, increasing certainty as to what the laws are. Furthermore, a 
higher standard of causation would decrease the number of frivolous suits, 
freeing up resources for employers to expand their businesses. 
A higher causation standard would also protect Missouri’s small 
businesses. “Small businesses are crucial to the fiscal condition of the state,” 
representing 97.6% of all employers in Missouri.197 In 2010, there were 
115,038 small business employers.198 A lower standard of causation in 
workers’ compensation retaliatory discharge cases, such as the one 
promulgated in Templemire, will make it easier for employees to sue their 
employers. As a result, employees may bring frivolous lawsuits against their 
employers in the hopes of getting a settlement. Those businesses have no 
choice but to spend money to defend the lawsuits. The legal costs will have a 
detrimental effect on small business owners whose financial resources are 
limited. Small businesses may in turn be wiped out by the additional costs. 
The easier it is for employees to sue their employer, the bigger the 
disincentive for small businesses to do business in Missouri. All Missourians 
must be protected; not only employees who are discriminated against, but 
business owners as well. Aligning Missouri workers’ compensation retaliatory 
discharge cases more closely with federal discrimination laws would protect 
both employees and employers. 
F. The lower standard has far-reaching implications for Missouri employers 
1. Expansion of Employer Liability 
The Templemire holding will greatly expand employer liability by 
lowering the standard of causation necessary for discharged employees to 
prevail against an employer for retaliatory discharge claims.199 The 
contributing factor standard of causation promulgated in Templemire means 
employees can prevail in an action against their employers, even if there was a 
legitimate reason for the disciplinary action or discharge. Employees may, as a 
result, attempt to shield themselves from disciplinary action by filing petty 
workers’ compensation claims. For example, 
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[A]n employee who admittedly was fired for tardiness, absenteeism, or 
incompetence at work would still be able to maintain a cause of action for 
discharge if the worker could persuade a factfinder that, in addition to the other 
causes, a cause of discharge was the exercise of rights under the workers’ 
compensation law. Such rule would encourage marginally competent 
employees to file the most petty claims in order to enjoy the benefits of 
heightened job security.200 
Any employee who is discharged and has filed a workers’ compensation claim, 
whether petty or not, is a possible plaintiff and a lower standard of causation 
will increase their odds of success.201 Accordingly, employers may hesitate to 
discharge employees who have filed workers’ compensation claims, causing 
unproductive employees to remain in the workforce, essentially creating unfair 
job security. 
2. Increased Frequency of Claims 
A lower standard of causation makes it easier for employees to file claims 
and recover pursuant to section 287.780. The lower standard for liability means 
employers are more likely to violate the retaliation provision. Increased 
employer liability will signal to all employees who have exercised their 
workers’ compensation rights that they might be able to win a retaliation claim, 
even if they do not think it had anything to do with their discharge. As a result, 
the number and frequency of frivolous claims will likely increase, 
overcrowding courts. Increased frequency of potentially meritless claims may 
cause employers to forego hiring additional employees in order to avoid the 
added costs of petty claims. To that end, employers may choose to relocate in 
states with a higher standard for retaliatory discharge claims, hurting the 
Missouri economy. 
The Supreme Court of the United States expressed similar concerns when 
considering the proper standard of causation in Title VII retaliation claims. 
Title VII’s retaliation provision makes it unlawful 
[F]or an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he 
has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this 
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated 
in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this 
subchapter.202 
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In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, the Supreme 
Court expressed concern regarding the potential uptick in Title VII retaliation 
claims as a result of a lower standard of causation.203 The Court noted that 
Title VII retaliation claims were already being made with “ever-increasing 
frequency.”204 As of 2013, the number of Title VII retaliation claims filed with 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) “ha[d] nearly 
doubled in the past fifteen years.”205 The Court reasoned that “lessening the 
causation standard could . . . contribute to the filing of frivolous claims, which 
would siphon resources from efforts by employer, administrative agencies, and 
courts to combat [discrimination].”206 Accordingly, the Court interpreted the 
language in the Title VII retaliation statute as requiring a heightened standard 
of causation.207 
In addition to expanding employer liability and increasing the frequency of 
workers’ compensation retaliatory discharges claims, a lower standard of 
causation has practical effects as well. 
3. Procedural and Practical Changes for Courts and Employers 
a. The Templemire decision should be given prospective-only effect 
The new standard of causation established in Templemire creates a 
logistical issue—when should the new standard take effect? The Missouri 
Court of Appeals, Eastern District, in Kueffer v. Brown, established a three-part 
test to be applied when determining whether overruling decisions should be 
applied retroactively to previous cases or prospectively to future cases.208 A 
Missouri Supreme Court decision overruling a previous substantive law should 
be given prospective-only effect: 
(1) if the decision establishes a new principle of law by overruling clear past 
precedent; (2) if the purpose and effect of the newly announced rule will be 
retarded by retroactive application; and (3) if, after balancing the interests of 
those who may be affected by the change in law and weighing the degree to 
which parties may have relied upon the old rule and the hardship the parties 
might suffer from retroactive application of the new rule against the possible 
hardship to the parties who would be denied the benefit of the new rule, 
retrospective application would be unfair.209 
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Application of the Kueffer v. Brown three-part test indicates the Templemire 
holding should be applied prospectively to workers’ compensation retaliation 
cases. The first prong is met because Templemire overruled thirty years of 
precedent established by Hansome and Crabtree. These seminal cases 
established the exclusive cause standard of causation. The Missouri Supreme 
Court explained that “the reasoning in Hansome, and the cases it relied on, is 
flawed. Therefore, . . . [Hansome and Crabtree] no longer should be 
followed.”210 The court failed to follow precedent and instead elected to adopt 
a lower standard of causation. 
The second prong is also met. Application of this rule retroactively would 
“allow a litigant who failed to respond to his opponent’s summary judgment 
motion to appeal the prior ruling and re-open a case that has already been 
appropriately dismissed by the trial court.”211 Although not stated in the 
Templemire opinion, one can “assume that it was not the Supreme Court’s 
purpose and intended effect in Templemire.”212 Fundamental fairness dictates 
that employers should not have to litigate a matter again.213 
The third prong, which balances the interests of those affected by the 
change in law, favors prospective-only application of the new contributing 
factor standard. Employees and employers “operate[] under and [rely] on the 
application of the law as it currently stands, not as the law may one day be.”214 
The standard for workers’ compensation retaliatory discharge claims was well 
settled for thirty years, indicating a longstanding reliance by employers on the 
old exclusive cause standard. 
Having met the Kueffer v. Brown three-part test, the Templemire holding 
should be applied prospectively to workers’ compensation retaliation cases. 
b. Action Required 
Employers should be aware of the implications of the Templemire decision 
before taking disciplinary action against employees who have exercised their 
workers’ compensation rights. Although Missouri is an at-will state, it is no 
longer enough for an employer to have a legitimate motive behind discharging 
an employee. Now, employees only need to show that filing a workers’ 
compensation claim was a contributing factor in the employer’s decision to 
discharge the employee.215 Employers should take the following precautions to 
protect themselves from such inquiries: (1) “strive to make the reasons for 
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disciplinary actions transparent and fair,”216 (2) “take all disciplinary actions 
knowing that the action may be reviewed or second guessed in a subsequent 
proceeding should the employee claim retaliation,”217 and (3) seek legal 
counsel when discharging an employee who has filed a workers’ compensation 
claim.218 
CONCLUSION 
The Missouri Supreme Court erred in overturning the exclusive cause 
standard of causation for a section 287.780 cause of action. The Templemire 
decision lowered the standard of causation in workers’ compensation 
retaliatory discharge claims from “exclusive cause” to “contributing factor.” 
As a result, employees only have to show that filing a workers’ compensation 
claim was a contributing factor in their termination. In doing so, the court 
failed to align workers’ compensation retaliatory discharge claims with other 
Missouri employment discrimination laws as it intended. Furthermore, the 
Missouri Supreme Court’s decision overturned thirty years of well-established 
precedent that had been ratified by the Missouri Legislature. Additionally, 
similar statutory schemes in other states support, at the very least, a 
“significant factor” standard of causation. Finally, Templemire has far-
reaching, adverse implications for employers. The Missouri Supreme Court 
expanded potential liability for Missouri employers, and, as a result, the 
number of frivolous claims will likely increase. Employers will be forced to 
decide whether firing someone is worth the potential expense of a workers’ 
compensation retaliatory discharge claim, thus creating unfair job security. 
LAUREN N. ROUSE* 
  
 
 216. Breaking Legal News in Missouri: Templemire v. W & M Welding, MCANANY, VAN 
CLEAVE & PHILLIPS, P.A., http://www.mvplaw.com/news_story.asp?newsID=143 [http://perma. 
cc/NH95-A58V] (last visited Sept. 24, 2015). 
 217. Id. 
 218. Conor Neusel, Changing Times: Missouri Supreme Court Reinterprets Workers’ 
Compensation Law, MICKES GOLDMAN O’TOOLE, LLC (May 1, 2014), http://www.mickesgold 
man.com/articles/changing-times-missouri-supreme-court-reinterprets-workers-compensation-
law-by-conor-neusel/ [http://perma.cc/6L9Y-9UE2]. 
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Saint Louis University School of Law. Thank you to Professor Marcia 
McCormick for her valuable guidance in the making of this Note. Thanks also to my wonderful 
family—Dad, Mom, Adam, Victoria, Kathryn, Jessica, and Will—for their love and support 
throughout law school. A very special thanks to my dad for inspiring me every day and giving me 
big shoes to fill. Finally, I am especially grateful to Will for encouraging me to “make each day 
[my] masterpiece.”—John Wooden. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
344 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:317 
 
